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This paper considers different approaches to measuring gender. It critically reviews 
gender role theorising and describes how this has informed two approaches to 
measuring gender as an individual phenomenon: gender orientation (the assessment of 
individual traits) and gender ideology (assessing individual endorsement, and 
internalisation, of social norms). It is argued here that social constructionist 
perspectives offer a viable alternative to gender role theory and that these inform an 
alternative approach to measuring gender as a social phenomenon: gender 
(re)presentation. This approach assesses group level endorsement of dominant gender 
representations. Endorsement is not seen to reflect individual traits or internalised 
social norms. Rather, it is understood as a social practice, made meaningful through 
shared understanding of dominant gender representation. This approach is introduced 
through a critique of the traditional concept of attitudes and a reformulation thereof. 
The practical measurement implications and benefit of this reformulation are outlined. 
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Introduction 
Attempts  to  measure  gender  have  paralleled  theoretical  shifts  in  its  understanding. 
This body of work is arguably most often associated with psychology due to its long- 
standing and well-established interest in the quantitative assessment of individual 
differences (Coaley 2009). This paper reviews gender theorising and demonstrates how 
psychological perspectives underpinning gender role theory have informed two 
approaches to measuring gender as an individual phenomenon: gender orientation and 
gender ideology (Thompson and Pleck 1995). Description of gender role theory as well as 
these approaches to measuring gender is not new. Yet, an explicit link between theoretical 
and measurement literatures has yet to be drawn. This discussion is then extended by 
introducing a novel approach to measuring gender as a social phenomenon: gender (re) 
presentation. This is informed by theoretical shifts associated with social constructionism. 
The practical measurement implications and benefit of this approach are also outlined. Its 
central claim, that gender should only be measured at a social level, signifies a radical 
departure from established psychological thinking. It offers the potential that gender 
measurement, customarily the methodological preserve of psychological research, and its 
benefits, such as providing large-group normative data, may appeal to those working 
 
 
*Email: russell.luyt@angliar.ac.uk 
 
 
  This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Gender Studies on 
August 5th, 2013, available online: http://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2013.824378  
 
 
 
outside the confines of traditional psychology. Here gender is more readily understood as a 
social, as opposed to an individual, level phenomenon. 
Many gender-related measures are available. These operationalise an array of 
constructs. Beere (1990a, 1990b), for example, categorises 18 types of gender-related 
measures. The most recognisable include those assessing ‘gender roles’ (such as the Bem 
Sex-Role Inventory [Bem 1974]); ‘stereotypes’ (such as the Beliefs About Women Scale 
[Belk and Snell 1986]); ‘attitudes toward gender roles’ (such as the Ambivalence toward 
Men Inventory [Glick and Fiske 1999]). This paper critically considers measures 
operationalising the constructs of ‘gender roles’ and ‘attitudes towards gender roles’. 
The prominence of these constructs in literature justifies their critical examination. This is 
illustrated well through a keyword search of the terms ‘gender role’ or ‘sex role’ using the 
literature  database  PsycINFO. These  terms  appeared  in  4292  peer-reviewed  journal 
articles  at  the  time  of  writing. This paper  therefore  does not  seek  to  offer  an  all- 
encompassing overview of gender-related measures and associated theory. There are better 
texts for this purpose (e.g. Beere 1990a, 1990b; Smiler and Epstein 2010). Rather it focuses 
upon and interrogates a concept – gender roles – that has featured significantly in the 
psychological measurement of gender. 
 
 
Theoretical rationale of measuring gender  as an individual  phenomenon 
Until relatively recently, the majority of research concerning gender has been informed by 
gender role theory (Connell 1992). Gender role theories are often referred to in the singular, 
as is seen in the term ‘gender role theory’. These suggest gender roles exist as a group of 
attributes considered appropriate for one sex rather than the other (Constantinople  1979).  
They  describe  processes  of  sex  typing  through  which  an individual acquires these 
attributes (Mischel 1966) and develops a related gender role identity (Garnets and Pleck 
1979). 
However, the term ‘gender role theory’ fails to reflect the often substantial differences 
between theories. These concern both the processes by which an individual acquires 
sex-typed characteristics as well as metatheoretical assumptions concerning gender 
(Roopnarine and Mounts 1987). Difference among theories risks rendering the term ‘gender 
role theory’ a misnomer. A more subtle categorisation of theories is possible. In the account 
that follows, older perspectives of gender role acquisition are described as belonging to the 
gender role identity paradigm, as originally suggested by Pleck (1976), whilst more recent 
perspectives of gender role acquisition are said to represent the gender role beliefs paradigm 
(originally described by Pleck 1981 as the gender role strain paradigm). 
The gender role identity paradigm includes some of the most well-known 
psychological explanations of gender (Pleck 1987). However, few authors have attempted 
to provide a systematic overview of this. Its review is difficult. Theories belonging to it 
have  been  modified, and  others  added,  so  as  to  accommodate  problems  in  earlier 
theoretical formulations (Pleck 1981). Nevertheless, three theoretical perspectives stand 
out in their contribution: classical psychoanalytic (e.g. Freud 1905/2000); (cognitive) 
social learning (e.g. Bandura 1977); and developmental (e.g. Kohlberg 1966). To a greater 
or  lesser extent,  each  of  these  perspectives suggests that  individuals  have  an  inner 
psychological need to affirm their biological sex through the acquisition of sex-typed 
characteristics. It is believed a female who acquires male sex-typed characteristics will 
develop an inappropriate gender role identity and vice versa. This is considered 
dysfunctional and is thought to result in negative psychological and social consequences 
(Pleck 1976, 1981, 1987). It is seen clearly in, for example, classical psychoanalytic theory
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where failure to resolve the Oedipal and Electra complexes is believed to be the cause of 
neuroses (Roopnarine and Mounts 1987). 
The gender role beliefs paradigm may be distinguished from the gender role identity 
paradigm. This distinction captures the major theoretical shifts that have taken place in 
gender role theorising (Pleck 1995). These shifts were in large part due to critique 
concerning the assumption that biological sex determines which gender role identity 
is  ‘appropriate’  and  functional  (Pleck  1981).  Information  processing  perspectives 
(e.g. Bem 1981a, 1981b, Martin and Halverson 1981) illustrate these shifts. Theoretical 
perspectives that share the assumptions of the gender role beliefs paradigm argue that 
males and females experience external social pressure to achieve gender-related social 
norms. Individuals evaluate themselves, and others, against these norms during gender 
role acquisition. They are motivated to do so in order to avoid negative social 
consequences (Pleck 1981). This is well illustrated by, for example, Bem’s (1981a, 
1981b) gender  role  schema  theory  where  prevailing  societal  definitions of  gender 
determine  the  content  of  the  gender schema which  in  turn  helps guide individual 
perception and organises self-concept. 
The theoretical assumptions underlying the gender role identity and beliefs paradigm 
are clearly distinguishable in the measurement of gender as an individual phenomenon. 
Constantinople (1973) is credited as providing an early and seminal critique of existing 
measures (Williams and Best 1990a). However, it was only later that Thompson and Pleck 
(1986) suggested that limitations primarily resulted from an inconsistent understanding 
and measurement of gender as either individual traits  or social  norms. Others have 
suggested similar distinctions (e.g. Williams and Best 1990a, 1990b). 
Trait approaches are largely grounded in the gender role identity paradigm. It is 
suggested that masculinity and femininity exist as a configuration of fixed individual 
attributes. Self-concept ratings on paper-and-pencil questionnaires or scales are 
understood to reflect real differences between men and women. Studies predominantly 
seek to account for the acquisition and consequences of sex-typed characteristics through 
behavioural and personality correlates (Thompson and Pleck 1995). Accordingly, 
masculinity and femininity are defined as ‘relatively enduring traits which are more or less 
rooted  in  anatomy,  physiology’ or  ‘early  experience,  and  which  generally  serve  to 
distinguish males from females in appearance, attitudes, and behaviour’ (Constantinople 
1973, p. 390). 
Alternatively, normative approaches suggest gender is socioculturally defined. These 
are typified by explanations offered by the gender role beliefs paradigm. The fact that 
gender role theory informs both trait and normative approaches may appear confusing. The 
assumption embedded in the gender role beliefs paradigm, that gender is determined 
through social norms but ultimately internalised by the individual as relatively enduring 
traits, results in this confusion. Greater emphasis is placed on the contextual specificity of 
gender. This challenges the unexamined assumption that an individual’s gender remains 
relatively fixed. However, the assumption that gender-related social norms are internalised 
is not questioned. Thompson et al. (1992) argue that until recently literature has not 
distinguished clearly enough between trait and normative approaches. This is reflected in 
the theoretical confusion of many measures that include, to varying degrees, the 
assumptions of both. 
In sum, it is argued that although the development of gender-related measures has 
largely proceeded in an a-theoretical fashion (Hoffman 2001), the assumptions of gender 
role theory are implicit within their design. So too are positivist epistemological 
assumptions where measures seek ‘to produce “factual” knowledge about an objectively
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present, and so observable and measurable, external world’, and, one might add, through 
behavioural inference, the internal world (Wilkinson 2001, p. 18). 
A more subtle theoretical distinction can be made between the gender role identity and 
beliefs  paradigm.  The  former  has  informed  the  measurement  of  gender  identity  as 
an individual trait, whilst the latter has suggested the measurement of gender attitudes 
as individually endorsed and internalised social norms. These different measurement 
approaches have been defined as gender orientation and ideology approaches, 
respectively. Thompson and Pleck (1995) report that the distinction has met with some 
resistance. Nevertheless, it holds advantages in that it informs appropriate research- 
specific use of instruments and aids in the development of new theoretically sound 
measures. In addition, evidence exists that instruments of gender orientation and ideology 
measure independent constructs and have differential correlates (Thompson et al. 1992). 
These two concepts are discussed below. This provides an overview of the fundamental 
and changing theoretical assumptions guiding gender measurement over the last 70 years. 
It also provides a critical foundation upon which to consider how social constructionism 
may inform a gender (re)presentation approach to measurement. 
 
 
The ‘gender orientation’  approach to measurement 
The early measurement of masculinity – femininity (M – F) (such as the Attitude Interest 
Analysis Test [Terman and Miles 1936]) was based on four key assumptions, overlapping 
with many of those espoused by the gender role identity paradigm, and arguing that gender 
fixed: a fixed individual attribute; not directly observable through overt behaviour; innate 
to individuals and as such a determinant of their mental health; and existing on a bipolar1 
and unidimensional2  continuum defined by sociocultural stereotypes of masculinity and 
femininity (Morawski 1987). Thus, individuals were assessed along a continuum, ranging 
from masculine to feminine at each extreme, in order to determine their sex typing. Gender 
was considered something individuals had, either psychologically or biologically, and this 
was judged appropriate depending upon whether it matched their biological sex. As such, 
non-normative gender traits (such as a woman who appeared ‘masculine’) were considered 
maladaptive (Windle 1987). Hoffman (2001) suggests that this conceptual- isation served 
as the basis for M – F measurement over subsequent decades. 
It was only in the mid-1970s that a well-developed critique of traditional gender theory 
emerged – contributing towards the gender role identity paradigm and related 
measurement (Williams and Best 1990a). The  critique  revolved around three  major 
issues. First, it was claimed that gender did not exist as a bipolar construct. Critics argued 
that masculinity and femininity should not be considered to be mutually exclusive. That is 
to say ‘what it is to be a man’ is not related in linear opposition to ‘what it is to be a 
woman’. Rather, the constructs were said to operate independently of each other  – 
although often in systematic opposition (Morawski 1987). Empirical evidence surfaced 
that undercut the notion of bipolarity in gender measurement. For example, findings 
indicate a positive rather than a negative relationship between the correlates of masculinity 
and femininity (Constantinople 1973). Second, the supposed unidimensionality of the 
M – F construct was said to be overly simplistic. This assumption was most obvious in its 
measurement as a single score (Morawski 1987). Evidence has been presented to 
substantiate its multidimensionality through a plethora of correlational as well as factor 
analytic studies.3  Accordingly, it is argued that M – F may best be assessed through a 
number of subscores (Constantinople 1973). Finally, scepticism surrounded both the 
empirical and theoretical foundation of existing M – F measurement. The most common
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means of measurement development was to administer a large pool of items to participants. 
Sex-based differences in  response served as a means of item  selection (Morawski 
1987); for example, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Masculinity 
– Femininity Scale (Mf) (Hathaway and McKinley 1943). This method4  was clearly rooted 
in the widely held view that masculinity and femininity reflected a basic biological 
dimorphism. This view became increasingly untenable along with the realisation that 
gender was not so easily categorised (Williams 1987). As such, critics argued that the 
empirical foundation of M – F measurement often relied on a false equation between 
psychological gender and biological sex (Constantinople 1973). 
Theoretical critique focused specifically on the rigidity of gender conceptualisation 
and its subsequent measurement. Psychological gender was understood as encompassing a 
set of stable and universal traits. These were seemingly uninfluenced by individual agency 
as well as social factors. That is to say, this understanding overlooked the notion of agentic 
self-concept in which individuals actively contribute towards the development of their own 
unique sense of gender self. Similarly, the role played by sociocultural factors in defining 
gender categories differently over context and time was ignored. Thus, whilst the use of 
standard M – F measures in assessing supposedly fixed gender traits may have seemed 
reasonable (Hoffman 2001), recognition that all measures find production within a unique 
sociocultural moment was absent. Their use persisted despite obvious variation in item 
content from one measure to another (Constantinople 1973). 
The failure to appreciate the potential impact of individual agency and social factors in 
determining psychological gender held negative consequences. Constantinople (1973) 
notes that in its insistence that the M – F construct included a set of fixed individual traits, 
deemed ‘healthy’ dependent upon an individual’s biological sex, gender measurement was 
guilty of casting the non-normative as abnormal. 
Theoretical  critique  therefore encouraged the  reassessment of  existing measures. 
Researchers took the criticism that M – F did not exist as a bipolar construct seriously, as is 
evidenced in the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (Bem 1974) where individuals were identified 
as one of four types: ‘masculine’, ‘feminine’, ‘androgynous’ or ‘undifferentiated’. 
Recognition that masculinity and femininity were independent constructs held important 
implications on both a methodological and a theoretical level. Methodologically, this 
indicated that gender could no longer be measured along a continuum in which a single 
score determined an individual’s sex typing. Theoretically, it implied that healthy men and 
women could possess cross-gender traits, and even went so far as to suggest the 
developmentally restrictive nature of traditional gender roles. As such, psychological 
gender was no longer understood as ‘appropriately’ related to biological sex. The concept 
of androgyny captured this new awareness. Crucially, however, the issue of construct 
multidimensionality remained unexplored (Windle 1987). 
Yet, by the mid-1980s theorising increasingly attacked what was perceived as an 
overly rigid portrayal of gender experience (Morawski 1987). Existing gender role 
explanations were said to neglect its contextual specificity through their emphasis on fixed 
individual traits. In disregarding the pivotal role played by sociocultural factors, these 
explanations were argued to adopt an apolitical outlook, which effectively ignored the 
impact power relations play in both compliance with, and endorsement of, social norms 
(Thompson et al. 1992). Morawski (1987) notes, however, that despite these criticisms the 
question of social power continues to remain largely absent from trait approaches. Unlike 
social constructionism, which adopts an alternative metatheoretical position as discussed 
below, these approaches do not consider power adequately within their analysis. They may 
therefore not easily be open to change. It is worth considering Constantinople’s (1973)
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early observation that weaknesses in gender orientation measurement may reside not only 
in the method of measurement but also in the utility of the construct they assess – gender 
as a fixed individual attribute. 
It is also necessary to acknowledge the inherent cultural bias of gender orientation 
measurement (Williams and Best 1990a). This arises due to the use of gender role 
stereotypes in guiding item development. Numerous authors have questioned whether 
these successfully capture what it is to be masculine and feminine (Morawski 1987). At the 
very least, continued dependence on the use of gender role stereotypes, underlines the 
sociocultural specificity of these measures. 
 
 
The ‘gender ideology’ approach to measurement 
From the mid-1980s onwards, trait  approaches to measurement met with increasing 
criticism. The normative approach was offered as a feasible alternative. Gender is 
described as a sociocultural product rather than a relatively fixed individual attribute. 
An individual’s endorsement of traditional gender norms is thought to vary across context 
and time. This accounts somewhat for inconsistency and contradiction in individual 
attitudes towards gender (Levant et al. 1992, 1996). The notion that gender exists as a 
sociocultural product holds far-reaching implications for quantitative measurement, not 
least of which, the suitability of techniques that arguably objectify, and hence potentially 
reify gender, as well as universalise related attitudes, ideas, beliefs and experience. 
The term gender ideology is used to describe individual attitudes towards gender- 
related  social  norms  (Levant  1996).  Measures of  gender  ideology  are  described  as 
assessing individual ‘endorsement and internalisation of cultural belief systems about 
masculinity (femininity) and male (female) gender, rooted in the structural relationship 
between the two sexes’ (Pleck 1995, p. 19). These definitions reflect the underlying 
assumptions of the gender role beliefs paradigm where gender is determined through social 
norms but ultimately internalised by individuals. 
Measures of gender ideology consider the constructs of masculinity and femininity as 
multidimensional  and  independent.  Multidimensionality suggests  the  need  to  assess 
support for dominant norms rather than a single masculinity or femininity script. Individual 
endorsement of these is seen to vary over context and time, as well as across age, culture, 
sexual orientation, social class and ‘race’ (Levant and Majors 1997, Levant and Fischer 
1998). In addition, the assumed independence of masculinity and femininity requires that 
attitudes towards these constructs are assessed apart. Accordingly, individuals are assessed 
along a continuum in order to determine their endorsement of independent and multiple 
masculine and/or feminine norms. 
However, a lack of systematic theoretical focus has resulted in a number of weaknesses 
in many instruments. It is argued, for instance, that measures of gender ideology ought to 
incorporate three key characteristics: an emphasis on multiple masculinities or 
femininities  (construct multidimensionality); a clear  distinction  between masculinity, 
femininity and gender ideologies (construct independence); and theoretically appropriate 
content in measuring ideology (Thompson et al. 1992, Thompson and Pleck 1995). 
Understanding that masculinity and femininity are multidimensional constructs 
provides a more sophisticated means with which to explore sociocultural variation in 
gender conceptualisation. It accounts for differential endorsement of gender norms, at an 
individual or group level, across dimensions. For example, empirical studies using the 
Male Role Norms Inventory (Levant et al. 1992) have found variable support for 
masculine norms along gender (Levant et al. 1996, Levant and Majors 1997, Levant et al.
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1998), ‘race’ (Levant and Majors 1997) and cultural lines (Levant et al. 1996). Findings 
even suggest urban – rural variation (Levant et al. 1998). The complexity of masculinity 
and femininity ideology is easily understood once interactions between these mediating 
variables are considered. 
It is also recognised that attitudes towards masculinity, femininity and gender do not 
constitute an internally consistent set of beliefs. Men’s and women’s experiences differ 
due to dissimilar life opportunities (Thompson et al. 1992). Stress is therefore placed on 
absolute gender characteristics. These typify either masculinity or femininity, but do not 
necessarily differentiate between the two, as relative characteristics would (Levant et al. 
1992). This implies that attitudes towards men will not be systematically related to those 
held of women or gender relations in general. Whilst these constructs are likely to be 
empirically correlated, their independence is demonstrated through their differing 
correlation to theoretically distinct constructs, or other meaningful variables. Measures of 
masculinity or femininity ideology that fail to appreciate this independence often include 
gender comparative items. This is argued to incorrectly assess gender ideology, that is to 
say attitudes towards gender relations (Pleck 1981, Thompson et al. 1992). 
Finally, it is argued that measures of gender ideology need to include appropriate 
content.  Thompson and  Pleck  (1995)  suggest  that  third-person statements  are  most 
beneficial in evaluating ideology, whereas the use of the first person may better assess 
gender orientation. Apparent inconsistent use of the third person in gender ideology 
measures is evident in Tolman and Porche’s (2000) Adolescent Femininity Ideology Scale 
which is written in the first person, whilst Chu et al.’s (2005) Adolescent Masculinity 
Ideology in Relationships Scale is written in the third person. A distinction has also been 
made  between descriptive stereotypes (that  is, ‘what men  or women are  like’)  and 
prescriptive norms (‘what men or women should be like’). Prescriptive statements are 
believed to convey the normative assumptions underlying gender ideology. Descriptive 
statements assess the notion of gender orientation in their focus on individual 
characteristics (Levant et al. 1992, Thompson et al. 1992). Neither of the above 
propositions has been assessed empirically and as such offer potential areas of enquiry. 
Thompson and Pleck (1995) also suggest the use of the plural, as opposed to the singular, 
helpfully underlines an awareness of construct multidimensionality (femininities or 
masculinities). 
In sum, measures of gender ideology have successfully addressed many criticisms of 
earlier gender measurement, in particular the lack of importance afforded to construct 
independence and multidimensionality. That is to say, they have developed the notion of 
construct independence, beyond that which was achieved by later orientation measures, by 
suggesting that all forms of gender comparison should be avoided. This is most commonly 
seen in their use of absolute gender characteristics. Additionally, ideological measures 
have been the first to achieve multidimensionality even though early measurement critique 
questioned the  dominant conceptualisation of  gender as  a  unidimensional construct. 
A commitment to multidimensional assessment has enabled these instruments to account 
somewhat for the contextual specificity of gender. This is seen in inconsistent and often 
contradictory endorsement of traditional norms at both an individual and group level. 
Finally, gender ideology has adopted greater critical awareness surrounding the limitations 
of gender measurement. Specifically, this has involved the careful definition of 
masculinity and femininity and has relied far more on a theoretically guided process in 
instrument development. The Male Role Norms Inventory-Revised (MRNI-R) (Levant 
et al. 2007) provides a recent example. This measure underwent initial validation by means 
of a student sample (n ¼ 170) in the USA. It is meant to assess the endorsement of
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traditional masculinity ideology through appraisal of a total (‘MRNI-R Total Scale’) and 
seven subscale scores (i.e. ‘Avoidance of Femininity’, ‘Fear and Hatred of Homosexuals’, 
‘Extreme  Self-Reliance’,  ‘Aggression’,  Dominance’,  ‘Non-relational  Sexuality’  and 
‘Restrictive Emotionality’). The discussion above has outlined two distinct approaches to 
measuring gender as an individual phenomenon: gender orientation and gender ideology. 
These are grounded in different measurement approaches, distinguished as assessing either  
individual  traits  or  social  norms,  and  informed by  the  two  broad  paradigms 
underpinning gender role theory. This paper argues that a third distinct approach to 
measuring gender as a social phenomenon – the gender (re)presentation approach – might 
beneficially be adopted. This approach, its underlying theoretical rationale  of social 
constructionism, its measurement implications and benefits are described below. 
 
 
Theoretical rationale of measuring gender  as a social phenomenon 
Social constructionism, which is grounded in broader postmodernist metatheory, has 
increasingly informed gender theorising. Epistemologically, it asserts ‘“that facts” are 
always dependent on the particular forms of language and the particular language 
communities which have created and maintained them’ and that therefore we ‘cannot 
“know” the  external  world’ or,  through behavioural  inference,  the  internal  world, 
‘because all knowledge is mediated by  . . .  the specificities of language’ (Wilkinson 
2001, p. 24). 
Pleck (1995, p. 22) argues that the gender beliefs paradigm is ‘in a broad sense, a social 
constructionist perspective that simply predated the term’. Yet, this reflects 
misunderstanding. Social constructionism recognises gender as relatively flexibly 
(re)produced within situated interaction, mediated by language and other shared symbolic 
systems, rather than an internalised individual attribute. 
Rubin’s (1975) valuable distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, which differentiates 
between the socioculturally defined ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ and biologically defined 
‘female’ and ‘male’, acts as a useful starting point for discussion. Numerous authors have 
considered the relationship between these two concepts (Deaux 1985, Unger and Crawford 
1993, Diamond 2000, Pryzgoda and Chrisler 2000) and the extent to which they are 
compatible with social constructionist theorising. It is claimed that these categories are not 
able to account for observed variability in gender practices over context and time. Neither 
gender (Williams 1987) nor sex (Fausto-Sterling 1993) necessarily appears as 
dichotomous. West and Zimmerman (1987) suggest the sex/gender distinction ought to 
be expanded in order to distinguish between the notions of ‘sex’, ‘sex category’ and 
‘gender’: sex is defined on the basis of socioculturally agreed upon biological/ 
physiological characteristics. An individual’s normative allocation to a sex category – such 
as male or female – depends upon their possessing suitable such characteristics. In daily 
life, individuals are not allocated to sex categories on the basis of these agreed upon 
characteristics, but rather through an appraisal of their gendered social practices. These 
social practices may be understood as embodying an individual’s gender. They are guided 
by  dominant gender  representations  that  suggest  what  practices  are  appropriate  for 
members of each sex category. Individuals reinforce their membership to specific 
categories through adopting ‘appropriate’ social practices. 
Thus, social constructionists recognise that sex categories act as primary organising 
principles in society but challenge the notion that these are an objective reality. ‘Sex, like 
gender, draws meaning from shifting cultural understandings and ever-changing social 
practices’ (Marecek et al. 2004, p. 207). ‘Sex’ is nothing more than socioculturally agreed
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upon biological/physiological characteristics. Likewise, individuals do not ‘have gender’. 
It does not exist as an individual attribute, characteristic or traits – however acquired. 
Rather, it is considered a product of situated interaction. Individuals are therefore seen to 
‘do gender’ (West and Zimmerman 1987). They constantly lay claim to specific sex 
categorisation through social practices. At the same time, they also (re)produce meanings 
concerning what it is to be a woman or a man in society (Bohan 1993). 
Social constructionism stresses the importance of understanding gender as a situated 
social practice. This accounts for its observed variability within and across contexts. 
Prescriptions and  proscriptions concerning  gender  differ  from  situation  to  situation. 
In order to ‘do gender’ successfully, individuals are required to adapt their practices in 
accordance  with these subtle situational  demands (Bohan 1993). Individuals always 
remain accountable for their practices in that these are open to social appraisal. They are 
aware of  this fact  and consider how their  practices  may  be  judged through salient 
sociocultural standards before undertaking them. Constant accountability ensures that 
‘doing gender’, whether socially acceptable or not, is unavoidable (West and Zimmerman 
1987). Individuals who fail to do gender appropriately are likely to experience negative 
consequences (Bohan 1993), whereas appropriate gender practices confer a sense of social 
competence (West and Zimmerman 1987) as well as possible material reward. 
‘Doing gender’ largely reinforces dominant representations concerning what 
constitutes appropriate gender practice. In doing so, it also legitimates sociocultural 
structures that are based on these meanings (West and Zimmerman 1987). This stresses the 
close relationship between systems of knowledge and power. Gender is constructed in such 
a way so as to perpetuate women’s subordination in society (Flax 1987). 
Empirical evidence supports the social constructionist argument of gender, 
demonstrating variation in its sociocultural (e.g. Luyt 2012a) and situated practice (e.g. 
Stokoe 1998). Thus, as Beall (1993) argues, cross-cultural research provides especially 
firm evidence. But so too does more micro-level analysis of human interaction. This 
theoretical perspective is able to account for variability in gender practices through its 
emphasis on context. It recognises that gender is in no way essential or enduring. Men and 
women may supposedly choose to adopt any form of practice. Crucially, however, in 
everyday life, this choice is restricted through ideological and structural constraints. Social 
constructionism nevertheless underlines the radical extent to which individual as well as 
social change may be possible (Bohan 1993). 
Some social constructionists raise concerns regarding the use of quantitative 
measurement for the purpose of gender research. These criticisms may be categorised as 
emanating from either a weak or a strong/strict constructionism. They are particularly 
damning of normative measures of gender. 
Weak constructionism argues phenomena acquire different meanings depending upon 
their interpretation within specific sociocultural contexts (Wilkinson 2001). These 
phenomena are believed to exist independently outside of interpretation. They therefore 
act to limit potential meaning as well as human action. Social constructions are also not 
merely considered fleeting or transient. This implies that sweeping change in meaning is 
unlikely to occur over the short term. Traditional research objectives such as theory testing 
and empirical generalisation may therefore remain worthwhile (Stryker 1995). 
Critics from this perspective suggest quantitative measurement objectifies, and hence 
potentially reifies, gender, as well as universalising related attitudes, ideas, beliefs and 
experience. Yet, this paper, which supports quantitative measurement as informed by 
social constructionism, argues that any use of linguistic categories unavoidably objectifies 
reality and makes possible its reification (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This is the case in
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both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Normative measures are also argued to oppose 
the assumption of universality through their emphasis on multidimensionality. This is 
partially able to account for contradiction and complexity in attitudes towards traditional 
gender norms. Yet, Thompson and Pleck (1995, p. 135) note that some still claim that 
‘these scales still assume one monolithic male role, albeit with component dimensions’. 
However, there  are  two  further  ways  through  which  to  counter  such  universalism. 
Researchers should be prepared to evaluate evidence of an instrument’s content validity as 
well as construct validity among the population in which it is to be disseminated and re- 
evaluate this evidence across time. This is rarely undertaken (McHugh and Frieze 1997). 
When  it  is,  in  a  cross-cultural context,  this  may  result  in  separate measures being 
developed. Although such an eventuality ‘complicates or totally eliminates the possibility 
of cross-group comparisons’ (Floyd and Widaman  1995, p. 295), it  still provides a 
worthwhile quantitative means with which to describe cross-cultural endorsement of 
traditional gender norms. 
Strong or strict constructionism suggests a far more radical ontological position. 
Meanings assigned to phenomena are believed to be constructed. However, so too are the 
phenomena themselves, which are ‘brought into existence precisely by the discourse that 
presumes to “describe” them’ (Bohan 2002, p. 75). It is argued that a reality independent 
of interpretation either does not exist or cannot be known. As such, there is no objective 
way or method through which to judge the ‘truth’ between competing claims concerning 
the world (Stryker 1995, Wilkinson 2001). A strong/strict constructionist critique  is 
evident in the argument presented by, for example, discursive psychology. The concept of 
attitudes and its measurement is the focus of especially stinging criticism (Potter 1996, 
1998, Wiggins and Potter 2003). This paper claims that traditional assumptions underlying 
the concept may be reformulated, and in so doing make it theoretically and 
methodologically congruent with strict constructionist perspectives. One such possible 
reformulation is briefly described below. Table 1 summarises the three approaches to 
measuring gender and their theoretical assumptions. 
 
 
 
Table 1.   Approaches to measuring gender and their theoretical assumptions. 
 
Approaches to measuring gender 
 
Gender
Gender orientation     Gender ideology representation
 
Theoretical 
assumptions 
 
Epistemological 
perspective 
 
Positivism                   Positivism             Constructionism
 
Theoretical 
perspective 
 
 
 
Gender assessed as 
. . .  
 
Gender role theory 
(gender role 
identity paradigm) 
 
 
. . . an individual 
trait 
 
Gender role 
theory (gender 
role beliefs 
paradigm) 
 
. . . internalised 
individual 
attitudes 
towards social 
norms 
 
Social 
constructionism 
 
 
 
. . . as a subject 
position relative to 
dominant gender 
representations
 Gender reducible to the  . . .  
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. . . individual             . . . 
individual        . . . social
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The ‘gender (re)presentation’  approach to measurement 
The concept of attitudes is central to the normative approach to measuring gender as an 
individual phenomenon. It has also featured prominently in social psychological debate 
for most of its history (Potter and Wetherell 2006). For these reasons, the gender 
(re)presentation approach to measurement will be introduced through its critique and 
reformulation. 
Despite its prevalence, it is difficult to locate an all-encompassing definition of the 
concept as its meaning has shifted over time (Potter and Wetherell 2006). Schwartz and 
Bohner (2001) note that early definitions of attitudes stressed that they remained stable and 
were closely related to behaviour. More recent definitions have emphasised their 
evaluative nature. These argue an attitude is expressed when an individual situates an 
object of thought along dimensions of evaluative judgement. Or, in simpler terms, an 
attitude is expressed when a person evaluates a perceived phenomenon either positively or 
negatively to varying degrees. The expression of an attitude is considered to represent an 
internal, pre-formed and stable mental state (Billig 1998a, 1998b). That is to say, attitudes 
cannot be observed directly, but only through the assessment of self-reports or behaviour 
(Schwartz and Bohner 2001). This explanation is compatible with the notion of gender 
ideology. As is noted above, measures of gender ideology are commonly described as 
assessing individual ‘endorsement and internalisation of cultural belief systems about . . . 
gender’ (Pleck 1995, p. 19). 
Discursive psychologists reject the traditional conceptualisation of attitudes. In 
particular it is argued that their stability is overstated. They point towards the fact that 
individuals may not express an evaluation in exactly the same way across, as well as within, 
situations (Potter and Wetherell 2006). Such variability in attitudes proves problematic for 
traditional perspectives seeking to demonstrate the existence of stable underlying mental 
constructs (Potter 1998). Schwartz and Bohner (2001) note that self- reported attitudes 
appear somewhat context dependent. Traditional perspectives account for variability in two 
main ways: stable attitudes are seen to exist, where varying responses are merely seen to 
reflect measurement error due to the influence of changing situational variables; or, 
relatively stable attitudes exist, but individuals access either a range of memory structures 
or multiple attitudes about an object, when responding to questions. 
It is nonetheless claimed that these explanations do not sufficiently account for observed 
variability as is seen in the analysis of social interaction. Evaluations are not seen to reflect 
some internal, pre-formed and stable mental state, but are rather believed to be situation 
dependent. It has been suggested that attitudes be described as evaluative judgements that are 
made solely on the basis of situationally accessible information (Schwartz and Bohner 2001). 
Discursive psychology extends this line of argument. Individuals are argued to draw on 
available discursive resources in order to make evaluations. Furthermore, when individuals 
make evaluations they are seen to be doing something, or more precisely performing an 
action. This implies individuals make attitude claims for specific purposes within any 
situation. Attitudes are therefore best re-conceptualised as evaluative practices serving 
particular functions (Potter 1998, Potter and Wetherell 2006). 
It is commonly argued that this re-conceptualisation makes the use of quantitative 
measures inappropriate. It is only supposedly in applying assumptions characteristic of 
social cognition work, which stress the importance of stable internal internal states as 
opposed to meaning making through social interaction, that warrant their use (Potter 
1998). In particular, Potter and Wetherell (2006) note the core assumption in traditional 
theory; that attitudes are clearly separate from the ‘object of thought’. A questionnaire
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item serves as the object of thought in attitude measurement. Participants are asked to 
reflect upon the item in order to express their attitude. Assessment of attitudes held by 
different individuals is made possible because objects of thought are believed to hold the 
same meaning for all. Most discursive psychologists disagree. They argue that attitude 
measurement is meaningless because ‘the object is formulated and constructed in discourse 
in the course of doing evaluation’ (Potter and Wetherell 2006, p. 207), or to paraphrase, 
the object only acquires meaning through the specific interaction in which the individual is 
asked to make the evaluation. 
Discursive   psychology   suggests   evaluative   practices   are   most   suitably 
explored through an analysis of social interaction. Potter (1998, p. 242) underlines the 
perspective. He: 
 
. . . treats action as fundamental or, as Schegloff (1995) puts it, omnirelevant. So if you want 
to understand evaluations you need to consider carefully what people are doing with them in 
their ‘home’ environments, rather than in the more arcane contexts of filling in attitude scales. 
The  extract  reveals  the  extent  to  which the  critique  concerning the  use  of  attitude 
measurement is largely based on a preference for bottom-up as opposed to top-down 
approaches to discourse analysis (Edley and Wetherell 1997). The bottom-up approach is 
informed by the work of theorists such as Sacks (1964 – 1965/1992) and Garfinkel (1967). 
Fine-grained analysis of textual features is undertaken in order to describe the action- 
orientation of social interaction (Edley and Wetherell 1997). Austin (1962) was the first to 
identify ‘talk as action’. He argued that language carries not only meaning but also force. 
That is to say, individuals are able to do and achieve things through the use of language. 
This suggests analysis should focus on what individuals are accomplishing through social 
interaction (Potter and Wetherell 2001). These arguments are evident in Potter’s (1998) 
emphasis on the action-orientation of text (‘action as fundamental’) and his explicit 
mention of a well-known conversation analyst (‘Schegloff 1995’). 
From a bottom-up perspective, which stresses the need for fine-grained or micro-level 
analysis of textual features in order to describe the action-orientation of social interaction, 
it would clearly be unsuitable to make use of scales or questionnaires. However, from a 
top-down perspective that explores how individuals are constituted or positioned through 
discourse, these research materials may prove useful. This approach draws heavily on the 
work of theorists such as Foucault (1978) and Marx (1867 – 1894/1981). It focuses on 
broad concepts such as ideology and power in order to explore how individuals are 
constituted or positioned through discourse (Wooffitt 2005). 
Potter and Wetherell’s (2006, p. 207, emphasis added) original observation that ‘the 
object is formulated and constructed in discourse in the course of doing evaluation’ reflects 
a bottom-up approach to analysis. Here discourse is characterised as a practice. 
Questionnaire items are not thought to hold a similar meaning for individuals because they 
are seen to be caught within ceaseless discursive debate. It therefore becomes important to 
understand the function of evaluative practices through features of the proximate context 
(participant understanding surrounding the type of conversation to which they are 
contributing; the actions made possible through sequences of talk; and the roles 
participants are assigned or assume). 
Those in favour of a top-down approach to analysis may have alternatively observed 
that  the  object  is  formulated  and  constructed  by discourse  in  the  course  of  doing 
evaluation. Here discourse is characterised as an entity. Questionnaire items are thought to 
hold a similar meaning for most members of a sociocultural group because they are 
believed to share broad systems of meaning. It therefore becomes important to understand
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the  function  of  evaluative  practices  through features  of  the  distal  context  (such as 
participant’s age, ethnicity, ‘race’ and social class; the research site; and the sociocultural 
and ecological milieu in which it is embedded). Quantitative measures are suited to this 
task. They allow us to ask a number of useful inter- and intra-group questions, for example, 
are traditional gender norms conceptualised differently across sociocultural groups and are 
they endorsed to the same extent across divisions such as age and social class within these 
groups? 
In seeking to answer these questions, the gender (re)presentation approach holds a 
number of assumptions concerning features of the research context, which distinguishes it 
from other perspectives. Both traditional research and discursive psychology view 
measurement research environments as problematic. 
In  traditional  research,  these  environments  are  deemed  problematic  in  that  they 
introduce potential bias. This is seen, for example, in the concept of social desirability 
which is defined as ‘the tendency for a person to respond in a way that seems socially 
appealing, regardless of his or her true characteristics’ (Furr and Bacharach 2008, p. 246). 
It is argued that we are better able to assess an individual’s ‘true characteristics’ through 
controlling for such bias. 
In discursive psychology, these environments are considered problematic due to their 
claimed artificiality. As noted above, Potter (1998, p. 242) views these as ‘arcane contexts’ 
that are removed from the everyday realities experienced by people in their ‘“home” 
environments’. Individual evaluations in these contexts may serve particular functions, but 
these are not especially useful given their alleged remoteness from ordinary life. 
The gender (re)presentation approach, by contrast, does not view measurement 
research environments as problematic but rather as constituting an important and 
meaningful context for data elicitation. They are not seen as introducing bias that clouds our 
apprehension of  an  individual’s  ‘true  characteristics’  –  as  suggested  by  traditional 
research. Indeed, as a social constructionist approach, ‘true’ individual attributes, 
characteristics  or  traits,  however acquired,  are  not  believed  to  exist. These are  not 
understood to exist in individual heads but are rather a product of social interaction. Nor is 
the measurement research environment considered an artificial setting that is removed from 
‘naturally’ occurring social interaction and hence superfluous – as suggested by discursive 
psychology. The research environments in which questionnaires or scales are completed 
are considered unique, but no more so than any other. This includes our so-called ‘home 
environments’ that do not exist ‘naturally’, inherently or independently of the social 
interaction that constitutes them. All are equally meaningful (Edley and Litosseliti 2010). 
It  is  important  therefore to  describe some of  the  potential  meanings that  frame 
measurement research environments. The gender (re)presentation approach argues that 
the way these research environments are understood by participants is indispensable for 
the meaningful elicitation and interpretation of data. Measures of gender (re)presentation 
seek to assess endorsement of dominant gender representations. It is therefore important 
that participants complete such measures within a research environment characterised by 
the normative. As described below, measures of gender (re)presentation need to exhibit 
five key characteristics, including appropriate content that is specifically tailored to the 
assessment of dominant gender representation. Through the use of, for example, third- 
person statements and prescriptive norms, these measures actively encourage participants 
to orient towards these dominant discourses and position themselves in relation to them. In 
this sense, a well-crafted measure of gender (re)presentation needs to reflect the same 
discourses of power that structure everyday social practices. So, when individuals 
complete  these  measures,  they  are  ‘doing  gender’  as  informed  by  a  normative
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environment. They draw upon features of the distal context, such as their perceived group 
membership, and apply available systems of meaning in order to interpret dominant gender 
representations, and so respond in a socially meaningful way. 
In sum, most discursive psychologists argue that the concept of attitudes is flawed and 
should be discarded. Potter (1998, p. 241) typifies this stance: 
 
. . . it would be easy to give the impression that there are pre-existing objects – attitudes – 
which are understood in one way, or one set of ways, in mainstream social cognition work, 
and then understood in another way in discursive social psychology. However, this would 
understate the degree to which the attitude notion is constituted out of social psychological 
theory, and the extent to which the notion is dissolved in discursive social psychology into a 
range of other considerations. 
This  stance  is  surprising. Recent  debate  among  social  psychologists in  the  UK,  in 
particular, has generated calls for productive engagement between adherents of traditional 
versus  critical  perspectives  [The Psychologist (2005),  vol.  18,  provides  particularly 
interesting reading in this regard]. The suggestion that the concept of attitudes should be 
‘dissolved’ in the face of discursive critique is not conducive to engagement but rather 
serves to polarise debate. It should be recognised that the concept has inhabited a central 
position in social psychological theory. This is unlikely to change. As such, it would seem 
more sensible to reformulate it from a discursive perspective. Contrary to Potter’s (1998) 
assertion, a reformulation of this kind is possible. It will allow discursive psychologists, 
among other social constructionists, to make use of quantitative measures when applying a 
top-down approach to discourse analysis. This would be in keeping with Abell and 
Walton’s (2010, p. 686) observation that: 
 
. . . discursive approaches to social psychology are a very broad church and the members of its 
congregation demonstrate in their empirical investigations dazzling inventiveness in their 
combination of approaches, methods, epistemological, and ontological positions. Further such 
a state of affairs is entirely consistent with the view that what matters is empirical utility rather 
than methodological purity. 
This proves especially helpful when exploring gender at a social or group, as opposed to an 
individual, level. Through the use of large-group normative data, researchers may gain 
understanding of dominant gender representations and theorise the functions any variation 
in their endorsement serve within and between sociocultural groups. Such variations may, 
in particular, point towards possible conflicts and challenges in gender ideology within any 
given society. 
This paper argues that measures of gender (re)presentation should include five key 
characteristics: an emphasis on multiple masculinities, femininities and other gender 
practices (construct multidimensionality); a clear distinction between masculinity, 
femininity and other gender-related concepts (construct independence); a focus on social 
or group level, as opposed to individual, phenomena; suitable evidence of measurement 
validity; and theoretically appropriate content. 
Construct multidimensionality is emphasised by measures of gender (re)presentation as 
is the case in measures of gender ideology. This facilitates a more nuanced and complex 
account of gender attitudes by capturing often inconsistent and contradictory endorsement of 
dominant gender representations where, for example, men of a particular sociocultural group 
may support traditional notions of masculine success but at the same time distance 
themselves from notions of traditional masculine toughness. It allows useful inter- and intra- 
group comparisons. As noted above, we may be interested in asking whether traditional 
gender representations are conceptualised differently across sociocultural groups as well as 
whether they are endorsed in a similar fashion across divisions such as age and social class
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within these groups. We might, for instance, discover that working-class men endorse ideas 
of traditional masculine toughness to a greater extent than middle-class men of the same 
sociocultural group, who, by contrast, endorse ideas of traditional masculine success more 
strongly. Lastly, it facilitates our being able to trace changes in the variable endorsement of 
dominant gender representations over time (McHugh and Frieze 1997). We may find, for 
example, working-class men increasingly distance themselves from notions of traditional 
masculine toughness. We could then ultimately theorise the functions any apparent 
variations serve within and between sociocultural groups. For instance, we might argue men 
of different social classes are most likely to endorse gender representations that they are able 
to practice most easily, as a means with which to position themselves as ‘real’ men. 
Multidimensionality thus provides a means with which to explore social, political and 
historical variation in gender conceptualisation, and in doing so highlights difference in 
gender attitudes, ideas, beliefs and experience. 
Construct independence is of central importance in measures of gender 
(re)presentation as  well  as  gender ideology. Levant  et  al.’s  (1992) observation that 
measures should be developed in order to assess absolute, as opposed to relative, gender 
characteristics is useful. Absolute gender characteristics typify constructs such as 
masculinity and femininity but do not differentiate between them. This recognises the 
independence of these constructs at both an instrument and an item level. That is to say, 
separate measures should be developed for constructs such as masculinity versus 
femininity representation, and items should avoid gender comparison. 
Social constructionists argue that gender is something we ‘do’ rather than something 
we ‘have’. Exploration of attitudes as an individual level phenomenon is, from this 
perspective, inappropriate. They are not considered to reflect some internal, pre-formed 
and stable mental state. Rather, they are understood as evaluative practices based upon 
broad shared systems of meaning, which serve particular functions. Measures of gender 
(re)presentation are therefore applied in order to understand gender as a social or group 
level phenomenon. We are interested in how gender is constructed in specific sociocultural 
contexts by discourse and the subject positions made possible as a result. Dynamism is 
recognised where the interplay of agency and structure allow attitudes to appear both stable 
and changing, unidimensional and multidimensional, but only meaningful when dominant 
gender representation is understood in the same way by a sociocultural group. 
Variability in gender understanding across context and time demands that we carefully 
obtain evidence in support of an instrument’s measurement validity before making use of 
it. Gibbons et al. (1997) note most cross-national research makes use of an existing 
measure, for which evidence in support of its reliability and validity in a specific cultural 
context exists (most frequently the USA), and applies this to a new cultural context. All too 
often, such measures are applied among populations for which there is no such evidence. 
At best, this implies a false universalism or an imposed etic in gender experience, one that 
is for the most part ‘white’, western and middle class. At worst, it reflects nothing more 
than idle research practice. As noted above, researchers should be prepared to evaluate 
evidence of an instrument’s content as well as construct validity among the population in 
which it is to be disseminated. A mixed-method approach, drawing upon the strengths of 
both qualitative and quantitative techniques, should ideally be adopted in order to do so 
(Luyt 2012b). In cross-cultural research, for example, the equivalence of measures should 
not be assumed. Measurement validation procedures should always be undertaken. 
Qualitative methods, such as focus groups, may be useful in assessing evidence in support 
of  a  measure’s content  validity.  The  cross-cultural meaningfulness of  items  can  be 
determined. In particular, the constructs they operationalise, as well as the settings (such as
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higher education) and tasks (such as asking someone on a date) they describe, ought to be 
considered carefully (Gibbons et al.  1997). This may indicate the useful addition or 
removal of culture-specific constructs (Gibbons et al. 1997) or that separate emic measures 
should be developed for use within different sociocultural contexts. Where justified, we 
should be tolerant of the so-called ‘scale proliferation’ (McHugh and Frieze 1997, p. 2). It 
is recognised that developing equivalent measures may neither be possible nor necessarily 
desirable due to differences in gender understanding across such contexts. This may 
complicate cross-cultural comparison. Yet, a far richer, albeit more complex, set of 
findings may  result.  For  example,  replicatory  or  confirmatory factor  analysis might 
indicate cross-cultural equivalence of some but not all underlying constructs. In such cases, 
comparisons would be limited to constructs demonstrating sufficient equivalence. Gibbons 
et al. (1997) also suggest that analysis of individual items, as opposed to total scores, may 
be helpful in such circumstances. 
Finally, measures of gender (re)presentation need to include appropriate content that is 
specifically tailored  to  the  assessment of  gender  representations. As  in  the  case  of 
measures of gender ideology, this includes the use of third-person statements; prescriptive 
norms (‘what women or men should be like’ as opposed to ‘what women or men are like); 
and the use of the plural as a means to highlight construct multidimensionality 
(femininities or masculinities as opposed to femininity or masculinity) (Thompson and 
Pleck 1995). The importance of theory in guiding measurement development is clearly 
evident. Table 2 summarises the three approaches to measuring gender and their 
measurement assumptions. 
This paper suggests social constructionism may inform a novel approach to measuring 
gender, beyond that  already  offered by  the  gender orientation  and  gender ideology 
approach;  this  known  as  the  gender  (re)presentation  approach.  Measures of  gender 
(re)presentation share an  emphasis on  the  independence  and  multidimensionality of 
gender with measures of gender ideology. Yet, they may alternatively be said to index the 
extent to which groups endorse dominant gender representations, which serve to legitimate 
 
 
Table 2.   Approaches to measuring gender and their measurement assumptions. 
 
Approaches to measuring gender 
 
 Gender 
orientation 
 
Gender ideology 
Gender 
representation 
Measurement 
assumptions 
Construct 
dependence 
Interdependent/ 
independent 
Independent Independent 
 Construct 
dimensionality 
Unidimensional Multidimensional Multidimensional 
 Cross-cultural 
measurement 
equivalence 
Possible and 
desirable 
Possible and 
desirable 
Often impossible 
as well as 
undesirable 
 Item characteristics Absolute/ 
relative 
First person 
Absolute 
 
Third person 
Absolute 
 
Third person 
  Descriptive 
stereotype 
Prescriptive norm Prescriptive norm 
 Level of analysis Individual/ 
group 
Individual/group Group 
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and (re)produce unequal gender relations, and in so doing make specific gender subject 
positions available. Gender is not understood as a set of internalised social norms. It is 
alternatively understood as a social practice made meaningful through shared 
representations held by members of the same social group. Interest therefore lies in its 
measurement at a group or social, rather than individual, level. This serves to compliment 
fine-grained or micro-level situated analysis where individuals are seen to strategically adopt 
varying gender practices and claim subject positions in the course of unfolding social 
interaction. 
It may be argued that this paper offers an alternative interpretative lens through which 
to view existing measures rather than an entirely new approach to gender measurement. 
Yet, an argument of this kind would fail to appreciate the important relationship between 
theory and method as outlined above. Measurement assumptions change only gradually 
across different approaches to measuring gender (see Table 2). But these are informed by 
underlying theoretical  assumptions that  contrast more starkly (see Table  1). This is 
especially  so when comparing the  gender (re)presentation approach against  existing 
approaches. Its theoretically informed claim, that gender should only be measured at a 
group or social level, signifies a radical departure from traditional psychological thinking. 
It offers the potential that gender measurement may appeal to those working outside the 
confines of traditional psychology where gender is more readily understood as a social, as 
opposed to an individual, level phenomenon. This brings, in particular, the benefit of large- 
group normative data. The challenge now exists to develop adequate measures of gender 
(re)presentation. It is hoped this paper serves as a foundation. 
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Notes 
1. A unipolar continuum contains numerical scores that extend in one direction and are interpreted 
in terms of a single end point. A bipolar continuum contains numerical scores that extend in two 
directions and are interpreted in terms of opposite end points (Lavrakas 2008). 
2. A unidimensional continuum assesses a construct through interpreting numerical scores on a 
single measure. A multidimensional continuum assesses a construct through interpreting 
numerical scores on two or more measures (Rust and Golombok 2009). 
3. Whilst different M – F measures share variance, indicating that they have something in common, 
they are not entirely comparable. It would be fair to expect relatively strong correlations to emerge 
between M – F measures should they be assessing the same construct – particularly given their high 
individual reliability (Constantinople 1973). Yet, these correlations remain modest at best. These 
findings are strengthened by results indicating that correlations between measures are considerably 
lower than their individual reliabilities (Williams and Best 1990a). Factor analytic studies of M – 
F measures, which seek to determine their main underlying conceptual structure through 
simplifying data, also question the unidimensionality of the M – F construct (e.g. Ratliff and 
Conley 1981). 
4. This method of measurement development is often referred to as criterion keying. It involves 
selecting items that correlate to a relevant criterion variable. It is a purely empirical approach as 
there is no underlying conceptual or theoretical rationale to measurement development. It is only 
interested in identifying items that can discriminate between pre-defined groups. Items 
demonstrating a weak relationship to the relevant criterion variable are dropped. These measures 
may contain items that contain little meaningful relationship to the criterion (Coaley 2009).
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